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Abstract
Firms use a rich set of incentives including fixed wages, bonuses, threat
of firing and promise of promotion. Yet, we do not have a theoretical
understanding of how such a mix of incentives can arise. This paper
aims to build a theoretical model which describes the incentive mix as
the solution to an optimal contracting problem and provides broader
testable implications. The basic model has a principal-agent
relationship with unobservable effort. The integrative model includes
the basic model and three building blocks: job-assignment, learning
and human capital. The derived incentive mix is a consequence of the
dual role of firing. It is both an incentive and a sorting decive. The
model￿s predictions are tested on firm-level data from a large
pharmaceutical company. The broader testable implications beyond the
incentive mix are also confirmed by the data.MŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
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OPTIMÁLIS ÖSZTÖNZÉSI CSOMAG
Összefoglalás
A gazdasÆgban, a cØgeknØl szØles skÆlÆjœ ￿szt￿nzőket lÆtunk: fix fizetØs,
bonusz, az ÆllÆs elvesztØsØnek a fØlelme Øs az előlØptetØs lehetősØge
egyarÆnt szerepet jÆtszik a munkavÆllal￿k ￿szt￿nzØsØben. Ugyanakkor
mØg nem teljesen Ørtj￿k a k￿zgazdasÆgi mozgat￿rug￿it a fent vÆzolt
t￿bbelemű ￿szt￿nzØsi csomagnak. A cikkben bemutatott modellben ez a
csomag az optimÆlis ￿szt￿nző, az optimÆlis szerződØs. A modell tovÆb-
bÆ egyØb, szØlesebb k￿rű k￿vetkeztetØseket is nyœjt, ￿gy ØrvØnyessØge
empirikusan is tesztelhető. Az alap-modell egy megb￿z￿-￿gyn￿k kap-
csolatot elemez nem megfigyelhető erőfesz￿tØssel az ￿gyn￿k (munka-
vÆllal￿) rØszØről. Az integrÆlt modell az alapmodellt hÆrom tovÆbbi
munkagazdasÆgban hasznÆlatos elmØleti Øp￿tőelemmel egØsz￿ti ki:
munkaerő-kivÆlasztÆs, tanulÆs Øs humÆn tőke. Az ￿szt￿nzØsi mix alap-
vetően az elbocsÆtÆsok kettős szerepØn mœlik: ez egyfelől ￿szt￿nző,
mÆsfelől lehetősØget biztos￿t a cØgnek a megfelelő alkalmazottak kivÆ-
logatÆsÆra. A modell k￿vetkeztetØseit egy nagy gy￿gyszercØg humÆn-
politikai adatbÆzisÆn tesztelj￿k. Az empirikus elemzØs nemcsak a modell
főbb előrejelzØseit, hanem az egyØb, szØlesebb k￿rű k￿vetkeztetØseit is
alÆtÆmasztja.CONTENS
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7.1 Proofs 241 Motivation
Firms oﬀer highly complex contracts, which involve a rich set of incentives, to their employees. This
paper asks the question how such an incentive mix can arise. The goal of the paper is twofold. First,
it aims at building a model which is able to reproduce the optimal incentive mix observed. Second,
following Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) it aims at deriving and testing the broader implications of
the model. The empirical testing of the model’s conjectures is done using the personnel records from
a large pharmaceutical company.
Detailed information on ﬁrm’s compensations systems are not easily obtained. Nevertheless the
evidence that ﬁrms use a rich set of incentives is accumulating, see Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980, 1981),
Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b) and Lazear (1992, 2000). In the dataset studied in this
paper we observe a contract similar to the one described in Lazear (2000) where the ﬁrm is oﬀering
a combination of eﬃciency wages and performance pay to the workers. In particular, we see four
incentive parameters: ﬁxed wages, bonuses, ﬁring and promotion.
Yet, economic theory cannot explain the mix of incentives. The performance pay and eﬃciency
literature contribute separately with a partial understanding of how ﬁrms use incentives. First, the
performance pay literature, which originates from Holmström (1979, 1982) and Mirrlees (1974, 1976),
explains bonuses. According to this theory, wages should include variable elements (like bonuses or
piece rate) to reward employee eﬀort. Second, the eﬃciency wage literature originating from Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) explains ﬁring (and promotion). If employment involves rent (due to higher than
market clearing wages), then the fear of loosing the job might provide incentives. Similarly, if there
are rents in higher ranks, promise of promotion can yield incentives.1
MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) build a model in which performance pay and eﬃciency wages are
possible choices. The model rests on implicit contracting: ﬁrms cannot be trusted to pay bonuses. The
outcome of the model is that eﬃciency wage, though in general more expensive than performance pay,
might arise because it gives compensation up-front and solves the ﬁrm’s commitment problem. They
ﬁnd, however, that ﬁrms choose either eﬃciency wage or performance pay. Thus, their results do not
allow for the incentive mix.
Our basic model, which is a traditional one-shot principal-agent model with hidden eﬀort, replicates
the ﬁndings in MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998). To address the aspects of worker heterogeneity
the basic model is restated in an inﬁnitely repeated setting and three additional building blocks are
added: job assignment, learning and human capital acquisition. The most important component of the
integrated model in the present context is job assignment. Job assignment implies that the purpose
of ﬁring becomes twofold. First, it creates incentives for the employees as in the basic model. Second,
it works as a sorting device where the ﬁrm can adjust the composition of the workforce to a proﬁt
maximizing level. The non-linearities introduced into the proﬁt function by the sorting mechanism
establishes that the incentive mix observed in the data can be an optimal contract.
In the next section the basic model is presented. In section 3 the basic model is extended to an
1Tournament theory, the third major branch of the incentive is disregarded here. Originating from Lazear and Rosen
(1981) tournaments put emphasis on competition between workers. If the number of workers rewarded, ﬁred or promoted
is pre-set, then workers have an incentive to exert eﬀort — and to compete with each other. The reason to disregard
t h et h e o r yi st w o f o l d . F i r s t ,t o u r n a m e n ti n c e n t i v e sa r et h es a m ea su n d e rp e r f o r m a n c ep a y( l i k eb o n u s e s )o ru n d e r
eﬃciency wage (like ﬁring and promotion). Thus, the empirical implication are not sharply diﬀerent from the ﬁrst two
theories. Second, tournament games give incentives to sabotage and undermine team eﬀort as shown in Lazear (1989).
In industries where team work is important (and sabotage is potentially costly) tournament games can be extremely
counterproductive. Our data provides no such information.
3integrative model by incorporating three additional building blocks. Furthermore the conjectures of the
integrated theoretical model are stated here. The data are presented section 4 and the close relation
between the empirical contract and the integrative model’s assumptions is emphasized. In section 5
the conjectures of the model are tested. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2B a s i c m o d e l
The basic model entails the contracting relationship between a risk neutral ﬁrm and a risk neutral
employee. The ﬁrm and the agent form a principal-agent relationship where the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt,
while the employee maximizes utility.
The employee produces probabilistic output which is normalized to 0 (low) and C (high). The
probability that the output is C,i sθ and naturally θ ∈ [0,1]. The employee, once accepted the job,
can inﬂuence the probability of high output by exerting eﬀort. The utility cost of eﬀort exertion is e,
and eﬀort increases the probability of success by δ. (We assume that θ + δ<1)
The employees alternative job option is denoted by ¯ U. The additional utility of promotion is UP,
and the utility cost from ﬁring is UF. (Note that both parameters are positive.) The utility loss from
ﬁring assumption reﬂects that if the employee is laid oﬀ then he must search for a new job, which is a
costly procedure as there are frictions on the labor market. On the other hand, the utility gains from
promotion assumption implies that promotion into higher ranks entails some rent. A possible reason
f o rt h i sr e n ti st h a tﬁrms have strong incentives to retain managers as disruption at the managerial
level is very costly. Thus voluntary turnover can be reduced by paying some rents to managers.2
The ﬁrm sets the contract through the following possible variables. She oﬀers a ﬁxed wage w,w h i c h
is paid unconditionally to the employee who accepts the job. Three variables can be conditioned on the
output: bonus (b), which is assumed to be paid to well-performing agent. Conditional promotion prob-
ability (πP), and conditional ﬁring probability (πF). The probabilities are conditioned on observable
output realization. It is assumed (without loss of generality) that the ﬁrm only considers promoting
employees with high observable output and only consider ﬁring employees with low observed output.
The variables are (realistically) constrained as follows: w,b ≥ 0; πF,πP ∈ [0,1].
Turnover is costly as the ﬁrm has to replace, and train workers who are ﬁred. These costs are
summarized in the ﬁring cost parameter K.
The ﬁrm, however, cannot promote unlimited number of employees (if we take the hierarchical
structure as given). The number of employees promoted is constrained by the number of positions
opening at the higher hierarchical level. (Of course, this reasoning implicitly acknowledges that the
ﬁrm’s hierarchy has more than a single employee.) The volume of promotions takes into account the
pyramid shape of hierarchies. As - quite naturally - higher level positions are less numerous than lower
level ones, the number of promotions (θ +δ)πP has to be multiplies by a hierarchy size factor (H>1)
to represent this discrepancy. Openings have two sources: First, the natural turnover in the higher
ranks and growth of the ﬁrm opens up new positions. This is captured by parameter g.S e c o n d ,t h e
ﬁrm’s ﬁring decision in the higher ranks of the hierarchy also opens up new positions. The model
assumes that the ﬁring rate is a ﬁrm-wide policy. Thus the volume of ﬁrm initiated separations at the
higher hierarchical level are given by (1 − θ − δ)πF. Summarizing the above argumentation, equation
2This observation is also underlined by the casual observation saying, that workers prefer promotion over non-
promotion. Thus, wages in managerial level seem to be over the compensating level for increased workload or re-
sponsibility.
4(1) shows the promotion constraint.
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F i n a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h eﬁrm has all the bargaining power. In order to rule out indeterminacies
we also assume that when indiﬀerent the ﬁrm prefers to ﬁre as little as possible. This can be understood
as a weak unwillingness on the part of managers to engage in conﬂicts.
2.1 Contracting problem
The contracting problem can be summarized in the following equations:
max
w,b,πF,πP
Π(w,b,πF,πP)= m a x
w,b,πF,πP
(θ + δ)C − w − (1 − θ − δ)πFK − (θ + δ)b (2)
subject to
(IC) w − e +( θ + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ − δ)πFUF ≥ w + θ[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ)πFUF
(IR) w − e +( θ + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ − δ)πFUF ≥ ¯ U
(F) H(θ + δ)πP ≤ (1 − θ − δ)πF + g
nonnegativity w,b ≥ 0
probability 0 ≤ πF,πP ≤ 1
Intuitively, the program above states that the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt. The IC constraints implies
that the employee accepting the contract exerts eﬀort and the IR constraint states that the employee
is better oﬀ accepting the contract. The other constraints follow from the assumptions directly.
Note that the IC constraint can be simpliﬁed:
(IC) − e + δ[b + πPUP]+δπFUF ≥ 0
2.2 Solving the basic model
The model is ﬁrst solved by assuming that the incentive constraints are binding. This is not an
unreasonable assumption, as non-binding constraints would imply wages below zero or other anomalies.
However, it is shown that the basic conclusions are not changed even without this assumption.
No slack condition: There is no slack in the IR, IC and F constraints.




− πFUF − πPUP (3)
w = e − (θ + δ)[b + πPUP]+( 1− θ − δ)πFUF + ¯ U (4)
πP =
(1 − θ − δ)πF + g
H(θ + δ)
(5)
As we had only four parameters to set the contract, choosing a single parameter (let’s say the
ﬁring parameter) determines the contract through these three equations. Consequently, the original
four variable incentive problem is reduced to a single variable optimization. Expressing the proﬁt
as a function of πF, the ﬁrst order condition reveals that the objective function is maximized at the
5extreme values.3 The two extreme solutions are referred to as "eﬃciency wage" and "performance pay".
Eﬃciency wage is characterized by a threat of ﬁring and promise of promotion as a way to motivate
workers. The performance pay equilibrium has positive bonus payments and no ﬁring. Lemma (1)
summarizes the results:
Lemma 1 In the risk neutral case under the no slack condition the solution of the incentive problem
is eﬃciency wages if:
2(1 − θ − δ)
UP
H
>U F +( 1− θ − δ)K
and if the inequality is not satisﬁes, then the performance pay solution prevails.
Lemma (1) tells, that the more proﬁtable solution prevails. It also allows for some comparative
statics. On the left hand side, the higher the utility of promotion (UP), the more likely that the ﬁrm
will prefer the eﬃciency wage solution. The reason is that promotion rents represent a "free lunch" in
incentives. Workers prefer promotion, which is not costly to the ﬁrm if positions are open. The higher
the hierarchical size diﬀerences (H) are, the weaker the promotion eﬀe c ti s ,t h u st h em o r el i k e l yt h a t
the performance pay solution prevails.
On the right hand side, increasing the cost of turnover (K) makes the performance pay solution
more proﬁtable as the required ﬁring decision for the eﬃciency wage solution becomes more expensive.
Increasing disutility from ﬁring (UF) has a similar eﬀect. The intuition is that in equilibrium workers are
compensated for this disutitiliy, thus for the ﬁrm it acts similarly as the cost of ﬁring parameter. Finally,
changes in the outside option (¯ U)a n dt h ec o s to fe ﬀort (e) do not change the relative proﬁtability of
the two competing solutions. The other parameter’s (θ,δ)e ﬀect are ambiguous.
Remark 1 If the optimal solution involves incentive slack, then either the eﬃciency wage solution or
zero ﬁxed wage prevails. Thus even with slack incentive conditions no incentive mix of ﬁxed wages,
bonuses, ﬁring and promotion can arise.
Consequently, the no slack condition is not pivotal in the result. The intuition for the result follows
simply from proﬁt maximization. The no slack condition on promotion probability (5) cannot be
violated in a proﬁt maximizing context. Firms promote as often as they have open slots as it motivates
workers for free. If the condition on bonuses (3) is satisﬁed with slack, then by deﬁnition the bonus
must be zero. (Else it could be reduced.) So, the eﬃciency wage solution prevails. Finally, if the
condition on wage (4) is satisﬁed with a slack, then the wage must be zero. (Else again it could be
proﬁtably reduced.)
2.3 Comments
The basic model reproduces the two competing theoretical solutions: The performance pay and the
eﬃciency wage hypothesis. In the basic model the choice between the two models depends on the
parameter values (Lemma 1). In this sense the model is close in spirit to MacLeod and Malcolmson
(1998) where the market conditions determine the optimal form of the compensation scheme. The
model also reproduces their result as either the eﬃciency wage or performance pay is optimal.
The rent feature of the eﬃciency wage contract is disguised in the model. The individual rationality
constraint (IR) is binding - consequently there is no ex-ante rent. However, the fact that ﬁring causes
3The proof is provided in the appendix.
6disutilities (UF) shows that interim there is rent. The interpretation is, that even though the worker
was initially indiﬀerent between the ﬁrm’s oﬀer and other oﬀers, going back to the labor market and
continue searching is costly. Thus, interim there is rent from retaining the job. The ﬁrm can exploit
this feature to motivate the worker.
3T h e i n t e g r a t i v e m o d e l
The integrative model extends the basic model in a way that will make it conform both with the
observed incentive mix and with other broader ﬁndings in the data. Hence, the aims of the model are
the same as in Gibbons and Waldmann (1999). Two major technical modiﬁcations are done. First, the
problem is recast in an inﬁnitely repeated setting. Thus allows for investigation of dynamic aspects.
Second, the integrative model incorporated three diﬀerent building block theories: job assignment,
learning and, human capital. The introduction of job assignment is to create sorting considerations.
This will, as it is shown below, lead to the optimal incentive mix. Learning and human capital are
used to establish a closer link between the data and the theoretical model.
There are two main diﬀerences between the inﬁnitely repeated game and the one-period game.4
First, a technical assumption about the number of employees. Now we assume a continuum of employees
(with unit volume) instead of a single one. This allows for an interpretation of the ﬁring and promotion
probabilities as measures of workers dismissed or promoted with probability one. Second, we have to
be explicit about the timing of the events for the model to conform with the repeated structure:
1. The period starts.
2. The ﬁrm oﬀers a contract (w,b,πP,πF).
3. The employees inside the ﬁrm accept or decline the contract. (IR)
4. Potential employees outside of the ﬁrm decide on the contract (IR)
5. The employees decide about the eﬀort level. (IC)
6. Output is realized.
7. Bonuses are paid, employees are promoted or ﬁred.
8. The period starts all over again.
The timing setup implies competitive wage setting through two channels. First, the ﬁrm and the
worker renegotiate the contract every period. The renegotiation creates a formal channel to introduce
competitive market mechanisms in wage setting of the employees. It is similar in intent to the Gibbons
and Waldman (1999) assumption of competitive, symmetrically informed ﬁrms. Also the assumption
is in line with our one-period basic model setup.
The second channel is, that the timing requires the ﬁrm to set the same contract for new and
incumbent employees. As was discussed, market frictions lock the workers into the ﬁrm. Thus the ﬁrm
can abuse its power interim, for instance, by reducing the wage of the employee. Of course, abusing the
contract interim is no free-lunch for the ﬁrm. In equilibrium employees foresee capture and abuse and
set their demands accordingly. The ﬁrm thus needs the commitment device not to abuse this capture
4There is a third change in interpretation. To work with steady state values g is reinterpreted to mean only natural
turnover (and growth is normalized to zero).
7and not to lower the wages of old employees. The no-discrimination requirement embedded into the
contract yields such a formal commitment device. Concluding, the timing structure of the inﬁnitely
repeated game sets the formal conditions for competitive wage setting.
The formal modeling restrict attention to stationary contracts at this stage. Firms handle all
workers the same, when deciding about bonuses and promotions: only the current period output
matters. Stationarity implies that the ﬁrm can maximize proﬁt by maximizing the period proﬁt.
(Thus, it is not necessary to formally deﬁne a discount rate for the ﬁrm.)
The inﬁnitely repeated structure is introduced through the homogenous employee setting. The
competitive wage setting means that workers care only with the current period’s incentives. (This
also renders specifying their discount rate unnecessary.) The ﬁrm also concentrates on the period
proﬁt level. Thus, in each period the contracting problem displayed in the proﬁt function (2) is
solved. Consequently, the results of Lemma (1) and Remark (1) apply to the contract set. Lemma (2)
summarizes the result.
Lemma 2 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with homogenous employees, the ﬁrm oﬀers the same con-
tract (in terms of w,b,πP,πF), as in the one-period game outlined in Lemma (1), in every period. Thus,
if the ﬁxed wage is non-zero then either the performance pay or the eﬃciency wage solution prevails.
Again, there is no optimal mix of incentives.
In the following the model is expanded to allow for a richer and more realistic setting. For the sake
of tractability, the three building blocks are introduced sequentially. First, employee sorting is analyzed
by introducing heterogenous employees. Second, learning relaxes the very restrictive assumption on
history invariance. Third, human capital acquisition is introduced to capture employee heterogeneity
across observable characteristics.
3.1 Job assignment
In this section we extend the inﬁnitely repeated model to accommodate employee heterogeneity. Em-
ployee heterogeneity will introduce an additional reason to ﬁre non-performing employees. As non-
performing employees are more likely to be of bad quality (as it will be shown), the ﬁrm can improve
on the equilibrium workforce composition by increasing the ﬁring rate. As this increase is non-linear,
the optimal incentive mix, in which the ﬁrm simultaneously use eﬃciency wages and performance pay,
can arise.
The extension to heterogenous employees is trivial if a separating equilibrium can be obtained - it
only involves adding an constraint to the optimization problem that will discourage bad workers to
apply for the job. The interesting case, which will be studied below, arises in the more realistic situation
where the ﬁrm can not force the potential employees to self select ex-ante. In this case selection issues
become important for the ﬁrm since the employee composition aﬀects the ﬁrm’s overall proﬁtability.
Potential employees are heterogenous with good (G) and bad (B) ability, respectively. Good workers
are more likely to produce a high outcome than bad workers i.e. θG >θ B. The proportion of good
types at a given hierarchical level in the beginning of the period is given by µF. The proportion of
good types at a one step higher hierarchical level is given by µH
F . Given that we assumed strict history
independence, the outside ﬁrms can not discriminate between the two kinds of employees. However, the
incentive scheme might imply diﬀerent utilities for the diﬀerent types. Thus good employees outside
option is ¯ UG, and bad employees is ¯ UB.
83.1.1 The period problem
In each period the same contracting problem is repeated. If separating equilibrium can arise, then the
problem is essentially the same as in the homogenous case. However, if separation is impossible, then
the ﬁrm is unable to separate the workers by the contract oﬀered.
Remark 2 Separation is impossible ex-ante and the pooling equilibrium prevails, if the bad worker’s
outside option is suﬃciently low (lower than ¯ U∗
B speciﬁed in the appendix is suﬃcient).
The intuition is that the punishment that the ﬁrm can impose on non-performing workers is limited.
It can deny bonuses and also it can ﬁre employees. If, however, bad type workers have worse outside
options than good types, then these disincentives might not be strong enough to elicit self selection of
good types. Moreover, the ﬁrm can not oﬀer arbitrarily unfavorable contracts (with very little bonuses
or promotion possibilities) because, then the good types would not apply.
Remark (2) implies that the individual rationality constraint of the bad employees is always satisﬁed
in the pooling equilibrium. Further more, note that although the proﬁt depends on µF it is taken as
given since the ﬁrm cannot control the composition of the workers within the period. Consequently,
the contracting problem of the pooling equilibrium can be summarized as follows (??):
max
w,b,πF,πP
Π(w,b,πF,πP,µ F)= m a x
w,b,πF,πP
µF(θG + δ)(C − b)+( 1− µF)(θB + δ)(C − b)
−w − µF(1 − θG − δ)πFK − (1 − µF)(1 − θB − δ)πFK (6)
subject to
(ICG) w − e +( θG + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θG − δ)πFUF ≥ w + θG[b + πPUP] − (1 − θG)πFUF
(ICB) w − e +( θB + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θB − δ)πFUF ≥ w + θB[b + πPUP] − (1 − θB)πFUF
(IRG) w − e +( θG + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θG − δ)πFUF ≥ ¯ UG
(F) H(µFθG +( 1− µF)θB + δ)πP ≤ (1 − δ − µH
F θG − (1 − µH
F )θB)πF + g
nonnegativity b ≥ 0
pooling condition ¯ UB ≤ ¯ U∗
B
probability 0 ≤ πF,πP ≤ 1
The two IC constraint can be simpliﬁed to a single equation:
(IC) δ[b + πPUP]+δπFUF ≥ e
The no slack condition means again that the IC, IR and F constraints are binding. Consequently,




− πFUF − πPUP
w = e − (θG + δ)[b + πPUP]+( 1− θG − δ)πFUF + ¯ UG
πP =
(1 − δ − µH
F θG − (1 − µH
F )θB)πF + g
H(µFθG +( 1− µF)θB + δ)
93.1.2 Dynamic game
The one-period game alone does not solve the inﬁnitely repeated problem (quite diﬀerently from the
homogenous case). The problem is that in the one-period game the equilibrium employee composition
is undetermined. In order to endogenously solve for this equilibrium composition steady state equilibria
are explored. If the ﬁrm applies a universal ﬁring policy, then the workforce composition will converge
to a steady state value. This steady state value is determined by Lemma (3).
Lemma 3 In steady state the equilibrium proportion of good workers (µ∗
F) in the workforce depends
on the ﬁring values:
µ∗
F(πF)=
µ(1 − θB − δ)πF + µg
(1 − θG − δ)πF + µ(θG − θB)πF + g
Moreover, the proportion of good quality workers in steady state equilibrium at the higher hierarchical






F(θG + δ)+( 1− µ∗
F)(θB + δ)
With these results at hand the equilibrium steady state proﬁt levels can be computed as a function
of the ﬁring parameter alone by substituting back into (??).5 Then the steady state equilibrium proﬁt
can be expressed as a function of the ﬁring parameter: Expressing all the other variables in terms of
the ﬁring decision variable as in the previous subsection. The solution is summarized in lemma (4).
Lemma 4 Under sorting an optimal incentive mix of ﬁxed wages, bonuses, ﬁring and promotion can
arise in equilibrium.
The result is graphically illustrated in Figure (1).6
3.1.3 Characterization
In the model it is established that in a ﬁrm where the optimal contract involves paying a combination
of performance pay and eﬃciency wages the composition of the workforce is important for proﬁt
maximization. Lemma (3) established the relation between the ﬁrm’s choice of the ﬁring probability
and the steady stage composition of the workforce. Lemma (3) is, however, silent about the implications
for individual workers. This section investigates these implications.
In each period the ﬁrm is laying oﬀ a proportion of the low performing workers. So, for the high
ability worker the probability of being ﬁr e di na n yg i v e np e r i o di s(1−θG−δ)πF and for the low ability
worker the probability is (1 − θB − δ)πF. Hence it is more likely that the bad worker looses the job.
Moreover, by the same logic good workers are more likely to be promoted, (θG + δ)πP > (θB + δ)πP.
The relation between the ﬁring and promotion probabilities will determine the ﬁrms selection scheme
and the results are summarized in Lemma (5).





5We are consciously abstracting away from the potential eﬀects of increasing quality at the management level. It
c o u l db ec a p t u r e db ya d d i n gMµH∗
F to equation (??), where M is ﬁxed parameter. This would only make the proﬁt
function more concave in the ﬁring parameter c.f. Figure (1). Thus, it is left for the sake of simplicity.
6The parameters used: µ = .8,θ G = .5,θB = .2,δ = .2,C =6 ,H =2 5 ,K=1 ,e = .9,g =4 % ,U F =1 ,U P =
1.5, ¯ UG =3 .9,w ∗ = .7, ¯ U∗
B =0 .40
10Firm profit level
as a function of the firing rate
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Figure 1: Optimal incentive mix in case of sorting
It is important to note that given the ﬁrm uses the performance of the workers in the decision on
w h ot op r o m o t ea n dﬁre, which is a key assumption of the model, the ﬁrm will always have positive
s e l e c t i o ni nr a n k . T h ec o n d i t i o nf o rp o s i t i v es e l e c t i o ni nt e n u r eo nt h eo t h e rh a n dr e q u i r e st h a tt h e
ﬁring probability exceeds the promotion probability. The intuition behind this result is that high ability
workers are more likely to be promoted so unless the ﬁrm is ﬁring low ability workers accordingly a
disproportionately large fraction of the workers remaining in the rank will be of low ability. The
positive selection on tenure is secured by laying oﬀ as u ﬃciently large proportion of the low performers
who are more likely to be of low ability.
A direct implication of positive selection is that the individual workers probability of receiving
bonus increase in tenure and rank. This result arises because high ability workers are more likely to
be high performers.
Lemma 6 The probability of receiving bonus payments is increasing in tenure conditional on rank and
increasing in rank conditional on tenure if and only if the ﬁrm has positive selection on rank and tenure.
Lemma (6) has implications for the ﬁring and promotion probabilities.
Corollary 1 The probability of promotion is increasing in the probability of receiving bonus payments,
whereas the probability of ﬁring decreases with it.
Since there is no learning in the model and the individuals external option (¯ UB or ¯ UG) is constant
the sorting has no implications for the wage. The combination of an increasing likelihood of receiving
bonuses and the ﬂat wage proﬁle, however, leads to an increasing earnings proﬁle. Corollary (2)
summarizes the result.
Corollary 2 The ﬁxed wage (w) paid does not respond to sorting. Earnings, however, rise with tenure,
if the ﬁrm has positive selection on tenure.
113.2 Learning
The sorting problem was investigated without learning. However, realistically the ﬁrm can identify
good employees on the basis of signals. Also, outside ﬁrms can expect to base oﬀers on veriﬁable signals.
Signals can include bonus payments, survival or promotion and, wage history. Thus learning has a
profound impact on the contract oﬀered. This subsection investigates the consequences of learning and
explores to which extent the results are changed.
Learning is introduced formally as follows. The ﬁrm ﬁxes the bonus paid, the promotion probability
and the ﬁring probability.7 The ﬁrm can use the wage to oﬀer better employees a more favorable
contract. Outside ﬁrms’ oﬀer captured by ¯ UB and ¯ UG, is also assumed to depend on the signals.
Note, that the ﬁrm and outside ﬁrms have the same information about the employee. Two factors
assure that. First, the ﬁrm and the outside ﬁrms have the same prior about potential employees
distribution. Second, the ﬁrm does not condition bonuses, ﬁring and promotion on signals - thus can
not retain private information. These assumptions mirror those of Gibbons and Waldman (1999).
The suﬃcient statistic for the signal history is the perceived type, which is denoted by ˆ µ. Perceived
type can be deduced by Bayesian updating. Perceived type can be interpreted as a monotone transfor-
mation of the updated probability that the worker is of good quality. Note, that perceived quality is
the function of bonus history: bonuses are linked to high output, and exactly pin down output history.
Hence, promotion and ﬁrings provides no additional information. Formally,
ˆ µ =ˆ µ(b0,b 1,b 2...) (7)
As perceived type is a suﬃcient statistic, both the ﬁrm’s and the outside ﬁrms’ oﬀers can be
written in terms of perceived type. Given that bonus payments, ﬁring and promoting probabilities are
not altered along with ˆ µ, only the relevant individual rationality constraint (IRG) is changed. This
constraint is binding under the usual no slack conditions.
(IRG) w(ˆ µ) − e +( θG + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θG − δ)πFUF = ¯ UG(ˆ µ)
Trivially, better workers have better outside options and ¯ U is increasing in perceived type.8 This
implies, however, through the IR constraint, that better perceived workers also receive higher wages
in the ﬁrm. Formally, if these variables are diﬀerentiable:






Thus, the above discussion implies that wages are increasing in terms of past bonuses. Lemma (7)
summarize. In other aspects, however, the earlier results do not change.
Lemma 7 Fixed wage under learning becomes an increasing function of past bonuses. Further more
the results of Lemmas (3), (4), (5) and (6) apply.
3.3 Human capital
Employee heterogeneity has been restricted to two, unobservable types. However, there are other
observable diﬀerences between individual employees. Most important is education which we denote by
E. The education literature (Becker 1964) has established, that educational achievement is positively
7This is a necessary assumption to preserve the stationary contract and the steady state equilibria. As it will be
shown later, the data does not repudiate this assumption.
8Remember, ˆ µ is a monotone transformation of probability of good type.
12correlated with ability, which was modeled here by type. Thus, both the likelihood of receiving bonuses
and the outside oﬀers are altered by the level of education. These results are stated in Lemma (8).
Lemma 8 Education is monotonically increasing in ability. Hence education increases the likelihood
of receiving bonus payments thus it increases the probability of promotions and reduces the probability
of ﬁring. In addition, education improves on alternative oﬀe r sh e n c ei th a sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on wages.
3.4 Empirical predictions
The integrative model presented above establishes that the incentive mix can be an optimal contract.
Besides producing the optimal incentive mix the model provides a broad range of additional empirical
predictions that are outlined in the conjectures below. In the spirit of Gibbons and Waldman (1999)
these will be tested empirically in the next section. The conjectures follow directly from the derived
Lemmas, so no proof is duplicated.
Conjecture 1 (Optimal mix) Sorting is a necessary condition for an incentive mix of performance
pay and eﬃciency wages to be an optimal contract. Thus, strategic employee sorting is present in the
ﬁrm if a mix of incentives is observed.
Conjecture 2 (Bonus) The likelihood of receiving bonuses depends on the employees ability. Since
the level of education is monotonically increasing in ability the likelihood of receiving bonus payments
increases in education. Furthermore, the probability of receiving bonus payments is increasing in tenure
conditional on rank and increasing in rank conditional on tenure if and only if the ﬁrm has positive
s e l e c t i o no nr a n ka n dt e n u r e .
Conjecture 3 (Wage) Wages are positively correlated with signals. Thus the wage depends positively
on education. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm has positive selection on tenure and rank the wages increase in
these variables due to their positive signalling value. Furthermore, since past bonus payments convey
information about the employees type, past bonus payments will increase current wages.
Conjecture 4 (Promotion) The likelihood of promotion depends exclusively on past bonuses. Hence,
conditional on the full history of past bonuses, the likelihood of promotion does not depend on tenure.
Conjecture 5 (Firing) The likelihood of ﬁring depends exclusively on the lack of past bonuses. Hence,
conditional on the full history of past bonuses, the likelihood of ﬁring does not depend on tenure.
4T h e D a t a
Four years of monthly personnel records from the main production size of an international pharma-
ceutical company are used in the analysis. Average full time employment in the plant over the period
1997 to 2000 is 5055 persons.9 These workers are distributed across four hierarchical levels ranging
from the CEO to non-management, see Figure 2. The share of management workers in the ﬁrm is 4.75
percent on average over the four years.
The analysis below use only those individuals who participate in the performance pay system i.e.
those employees who besides their base salary can get a bonus given suﬃciently high performance
evaluations. The distinction between strictly ﬁxed paid employees and employees facing an incentive
9The analysis is focused on permanent full time employment which corresponds to 92.66 percent of all individuals
employed on the production site.
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Figure 2: The hierarchy of the ﬁrm, 1997 to 2000.
mix can be made by looking at the worker’s job category. This exercise reveals that the group of ﬁxed
paid employees constitute 36.96 percent of the workforce and that it mainly consists of production
workers.10
The characteristics of the employees calculated from the monthly employee-based observations are
presented in the second and third columns of Table 3. On average the employees included in the
analysis (column 3) have 8.91 years of tenure. The same group of individuals consists of 60.6 percent
women and the average age is 39.51 years.
The ﬁrm is operating in an industry where product development is essential for survival, hence a
large proportion of the workforce is engaged in research and development. These activities are reﬂected
by a relatively high education level in the ﬁrm.11 It is remarkable that 21.9 percent of the employees
have at least a master degree and 11.7 percent have a degree that in duration corresponds to a bachelor
degree. Only 12.5 percent of the labour force is unskilled. The level of education is also relatively high
in production. A possible explanation is that production requires a minimum of manual labor as there
is a high degree of automation. Furthermore, in order to comply with the demands of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) extensive quality control programmes are implemented which requires
skilled labor.
The ﬁrms yearly separation rate is 10.96 percent. The turnover is costly for the ﬁrm but never
the less 12.64 percent of all separations are initiated by the ﬁrm though layoﬀs.12 There are two
motivations for laying oﬀ workers. First, the ﬁrms oﬃcial wage strategy is to "oﬀer attractive salary
and employment conditions" in order to "attract, develop and retain qualiﬁed employees".G i v e nt h e
"attractive" wages the ﬁrm can use the threat of a layoﬀ to motivate the workers i.e. the combination
of "attractive" wages and layoﬀs will make the workers exert higher eﬀort. Second, the layoﬀss e r v e
as a sorting device where underperformers are forced to separate from the ﬁrm in each period. Hence
in a pooling equilibrium where both high and low ability workers are employed by the ﬁrm layoﬀsc a n
10T h ew o r k e rc h o o s eb e t w e e nﬁxed wage and the incentive mix contracts ex-ante hence the analysis is performed
conditional on this initial sorting.
11Information on education is missing for 8.21 percent of the employees. However, for the group of employees receiving
performance pay only 2.84 percent have missing information on education.
12The sepration rate for the employees participating in the performance pay system is 6.64 percent. Of these 19.46
percent are initiated by the ﬁrm. The institutional settings impose no restriction on who to ﬁre.
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Figure 3: Descriptive statistics
be used to control the worker composition.
The base salary paid by the ﬁrm is highly predictable given the characteristics of the individuals




.T h i sﬁnding is in line with expectations since the ﬁrms oﬃcial wage
policy explicitly states that: "Base salary is a competitive pay for job function, responsibilities and
competencies. The base salary is driven by the market and increases should not be driven by individual
performance".T h eﬁrms’s wage structure (unconditional on human capital and signals) is such that
the wage premium for moving from non-management and into lower and middle management are 52.12
percent and 83.70 percent, respectively. Wages are not observable for higher level management.
Individuals are rewarded for performance through a ﬁrm-wide bonus system. The allocation of
bonuses will, according to the ﬁrms remuneration principles, fulﬁll the criteria that: "The principles,
criteria and targets that will lead to bonus payments should be known by the relevant employee subgroup".
The size of the bonus-pool varies across the diﬀerent employee subgroups and constitute 2.5-4 percent
of the wage sum for non-management workers and 8 percent for non-executive managers. As for wages
the performance related compensation package for higher level managers is not observed in the data.13
The widespread use of bonuses in the ﬁrm is conﬁrmed by the data which shows that 24 percent of
workers in non-management will receive bonus payments in a given year. The numbers are closer to
75 and 80 percent for managers and vice presidents, respectively.
4.1 The empirical contract and the theoretical assumptions
In the presentation of the ﬁrm it becomes clear that the contract oﬀered by the ﬁrm to the workers
is highly complex in nature. First, the ﬁrm pays ﬁxed wages to all workers who accept the contract
unconditional on performance. The ﬁxed wages are argued to be driven by the market. Second, even
13The subsequent analysis is based on non-management employees, managers and, vice presidents. The Excecutive
management is omitted due to lack of data. An analysis of excecutive management compensation is conducted in Murphy
(1999) and Hall and Murphy (2003).
15though turnover is costly for the ﬁrm, a signiﬁcant part of separations are ﬁrm initiated i.e. layoﬀs.
The presence of interim rents and the threat of ﬁring creates incentives for the workers to exert eﬀort.
Third, 63 percent of the employees are rewarded for performance through a bonus system. Pay for
performance is an additional source that encourage the employees to exert eﬀort. Finally, the ﬁrm has
ports of entry (i.e. 98.22 percent of the employees are hired into the lowest hierarchical level). This
implies that promotions to higher level jobs take place, mainly, from the pool of incumbent employees
creating additional incentives. In sum, the data describe a contract that contains four parameters: w,
b, πP,a n dπF. These parameters are the key parameters of our theoretical model.
The description of the empirical contract reveals that the ﬁrm is using a combination of performance
pay and eﬃciency wages. The theoretical motivation for using both policy devices is to create incentives
for workers but also to be able to control the composition of the workforce. In the next section we
examine how the incentive mix is implemented in practice and investigate to what extent employee
sorting is important for the ﬁrm.
5 Empirical analysis
Conjecture 1 stated that employee sorting is a necessary condition for the incentive mix to be an
optimal contract. Preliminary evidence for sorting is found in the description of the empirical contract
where it is established that layoﬀs are common in the ﬁrm i.e. πF > 0. T h ep r e s e n c eo fl a y o ﬀsi s
a necessary condition for sorting but not suﬃcient in the sense that random ﬁring would produce no
sorting. Random ﬁring, however, would at all times be ineﬃcient for the ﬁrm due to the costs associated
with turnover. Thus a ﬁr s tt e s tf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fs o r t i n gi nt h eﬁrm it to investigate whether the ﬁrm
has random sorting or whether it is using information about the employee’s ability (such as revealed
performance) in the layoﬀ decision.
To establish that the ﬁrm is sorting when it comes to layoﬀs a multinomial logit model, where
the individual is facing the three options: Stay within rank, promotion and layoﬀ,i se s t i m a t e d . 14
The point estimates of a multinomial logit are diﬃcult to interpret hence the results of the model are
evaluated using predictions.15 The eﬀect of a bonus payment on the transition probabilities for the
average sample member is presented in row four of Table 4. A person who receive a bonus payment
has a 1.553 per mille chance of being promoted in a given month while the layoﬀ probability is as low
as 0.237 per mille. In contrast, a person who did not receive a bonus payment has almost no chance
of being promoted and face a 2.204 per mille risk of being laid oﬀ from the ﬁrm in any given month.
The empirical evidence presented in Table 4 shows that the ﬁrm tend to layoﬀ low performing
workers hence as stated in Conjecture 1 there is clear evidence for sorting in the ﬁrm. Further more
it reveals that the layoﬀ probability exceeds the promotion probability which according to lemma (5)
would imply negative selection in tenure. However, there may be measurement errors in the variable
that indicates the reason for the job separation. An obvious bias arise in the cases where the ﬁrm
is signalling to the worker that the employment relation will end in the near future. This signal will
make the worker look for alternative employment which may be obtained before the ﬁrm terminates
the match. We have reason to believe that this procedure is common. The implication is that the
layoﬀso b s e r v e di nt h eﬁrm only constitute a lower bound on the separations that in reality are layoﬀs.
Hence, alternative evidence for the type of selection scheme used by the ﬁrm should be obtained from
14It should be noted that the individuals who separate for natural causes such as retirement or death and the individuals
who leave the ﬁrm for a new job have been deleted from the sample.
15The full regression results of the multinomial logit can be seen in the appendix.
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Figure 4: Predicted monthly transitions
the data.
Conjecture 2 focuses on bonus payments. Since the likelihood of receiving bonuses depends on
employee ability, the selection scheme used by the ﬁrm and the probability of receiving bonus are
closely linked (Lemma 6). A consequence of positive selection in tenure and rank is that more able
workers in general will have longer tenure and be assigned to higher rank jobs. Hence, if the ﬁrm has
positive selection employees with longer tenure and higher ranks will be more likely to receive bonus
payments. This provides an additional test for the type of selection scheme used by the ﬁrm.
Table 5 presents logit regressions for the probability of having received a bonus payment during
the preceding year. In the ﬁrst model only tenure and rank are included in the regression and we ﬁnd
that these variables increase the likelihood of receiving bonus payments. The results are robust to the
inclusion of information on demography (age-splines and gender), see model 2. In model 3 information
on education is added. The positive relation between educational attainment and ability implies that
workers with higher levels of schooling will be more likely to receive bonus payments (Lemma 8) -
ar e s u l tt h a ti sc o n ﬁrmed by the data. The positive eﬀect of tenure and rank on the probability of
receiving bonuses remains in model 3 which is indicating that ability is signalled only partially through
education.
The eﬀect of tenure on the likelihood of receiving bonus payments is the main source to identiﬁcation
of the ﬁrms selection scheme. For this reason, an additional speciﬁcation for the likelihood of receiving
a bonus payment is provided. We estimate a model similar to model (3) in Table 5 but substitute the
tenure-splines for yearly tenure dummies (detailed results are not shown).16 Figure 6 illustrates the
eﬀect of tenure on the likelihood of receiving bonus for the ﬁrst 25 years of tenure.17 In accordance
with the predictions from positive sorting the eﬀect is increasing, but so is the variance as we get to
higher tenure levels (tenure above 16 years). However, the steady increase in the likelihood of receiving
bonuses during the ﬁrst many years of employment reﬂects that sorting is an integrated part of the
ﬁrms policy.
Based on the evidence from Table 5 and Figure 6 there is clear evidence for positive selection in
the ﬁrm. This observation support the assumption that sorting is important for the ﬁrm which is
16T h em a x i m u ml e v e lo ft e n u r ei nt h eﬁrm is 44 years but less than 3.25 percent of the employees have tenure above
25 years causing large standard errors on the point estimates of the tenure dummies exceeding the 25th year.
17It should be noted that it is very uncommon to receive bonus payments during the ﬁrst year of employment (occur
in less than 3.5 of the cases) which explains the level for the tenure eﬀect.
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   0.369 
(0.135) 
Bachelor degree      0.497 
(0.138) 
Masters or PhD degree 
 
 
   0.663 
(0.154) 
      
Demographic variables  NO  YES  YES 
Job category  YES  YES  YES 
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES 
      
Log likelihood  -73,228  -73,084  -72,953 
# observations  138,703  138,703  138,703 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. 
Figure 5: Logit regression for bonus payments
used to establish that the incentive mix of eﬃciency wages and performance pay can be an optimal
contract. Furthermore, the positive selection has, through its eﬀect on the likelihood of receiving bonus,
implications for the individuals earnings growth which will be studied below.
Conjecture 3 describes the ﬁrm’s wage setting. The ﬁrms oﬃcial wage policy is to pay employees
competitive wages that do not depend on the employees performance (recall that high performance is
rewarded through the bonus system). In the context of the model this implies that once the optimal
contract is set, i.e. πP and πF and b are chosen, the wage oﬀered to the worker depends on the good
type’s outside valuation ¯ UG. Absent learning the ﬁxed wage does not change over time as shown in
Corollary (2). However, the ﬁrms sorting scheme described above reveals information about the workers
quality that may be impossible to hide for the individuals potential employers hence the market may
learn about the workers quality through observable credentials such as the workers tenure, current
rank in the ﬁrm and received bonus payments. The consequence of learning is that when the perceived
quality of the individual goes up it causes an increase in wages as shown in Lemma (7).
A direct test of the eﬀect of learning on wages can be conducted using standard Mincer wage
regressions, see Table 7. Model 1 in Table 7 shows increasing wages in education, tenure and rank - a
result that was highly expected. Model 2 explores the eﬀect of a bonus payment last period on current
wages. The point estimate show that a bonus payment last period (which can also be interpreted at
high output) increases current wages by 4.43 percent. An extension of this analysis is conducted in
model 3 where information of up to 4 years of lagged bonus payments is included. The remarkable
result reveal that lagged bonus payments are highly signiﬁcant. Further more they seem to have similar
eﬀects on current wages hence the timing of bonus does not seem to have big eﬀect. To investigate this
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95% CI-upper Tenure effect 95% CI-lower
Figure 6: Tenure eﬀect on the likelihood of receiving bonus payments.
with an interaction eﬀect capturing the consequences for current wages of receiving bonuses in both
years.18 This regression reveals that workers are rewarded for bonus payments in both periods but the
value of the signal is deﬂated slightly when the employee’s performance is rewarded with bonuses in
both periods (due to the negative interaction term). This may simply be a consequence of the Bayesian
updating. In sum, there is strong empirical evidence for the learning model and the signals related to
education, rank, tenure and lagged bonus payments are all important for the determination of wages.
Conjecture 4 and 5 address the models prediction related to promotions and layoﬀs. In the dis-
cussion of Conjecture 1 it was established that past performance, i.e. bonus payments, were a key
determinant for the ﬁrms decision on whom to ﬁre and whom to promote. These results are naturally
conﬁrmed by table 8 which presents logit regressions for the probabilities of being promoted and laid
oﬀ.
An interesting aspect of the results presented in Table 8 is that not all workers have equal promotion
probabilities conditional on performance. An example is that none of the employees with a short
theoretical education are promoted in the four year period studied. In contrast, the employees with
a masters or Ph.D. degree are signiﬁcantly more likely to be promoted than employees with less
than a bachelors degree (column 3). When we look within educational groups tenure is insigniﬁcant.
These observations suggests that certain skills are required in order to be promoted i.e. skills that
are correlated with the level of schooling. Fascinating is it to combine the results of the promotion
regression with the results of the layoﬀ regression. In the layoﬀ regression there is a tendency that
the employee subgroups who are less likely to be promoted, i.e. skill workers and employees with a
short theoretical education, are "compensated" through signiﬁcantly lower layoﬀ probabilities. This
combined result suggests that the ﬁrm accommodates that some employee subgroups lack incentives
through promotions and adjust the parameters of the contract such that the incentive and participation
constraints of the optimal contract are satisﬁed. The consequence of this behavior is that the ﬁrm oﬀers
diﬀerent contracts to its diﬀerent employee subgroups; subgroups that are deﬁned by their educational
18The focus on the last two years bonus payments is only for expositional reasons and could easily be extended to
include all four years and their interaction terms.
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Bonus payment three 
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Bonus payment four 
years ago 
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(0.007) 
 
Bonus payment last year 
and two years ago 
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Demographic  variables  YES YES YES YES 
Job  category  YES YES YES YES 
Time  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
      
R-squared  0.6184 0.6187 0.5922 0.6138 
#  observations  147,602 138,703 109,440 130,068 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. The numbers of observations vary across the 
models and are determined by the number of the lagged variables included in the regression.  
Figure 7: Mincer wage equations.
attainment.
In sum, the empirical evidence presented above provide strong evidence for the models conjectures.
First, using the description of the empirical contract and the bonus regression we conclude that the
ﬁrm has positive selection on tenure and rank. This is a conclusion that is stronger than required in
order to establish that the incentive mix can be an optimal contract for the ﬁrm. Second, there is
strong evidence for learning in the sense that wages are found to be positively correlated with signals
i.e. tenure, rank, education and past bonus payments. Finally, bonus is found to be a strong predictor
for the ﬁrms decision on who to promote and layoﬀ. There is evidence for the fact, however, that there
are skill requirements when workers are promoted. This implies that some employee subgroups are
unlikely to be promoted which will reduce the incentives for the employees to exert eﬀort. The ﬁrm
accommodates this by oﬀering heterogenous contracts to the diﬀerent employee subgroups.
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Demographic variables  YES  YES 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
    
Log likelihood  -866.50  -1014.29 
# observations  119,762  81,956 
Note: Individuals with a short theoretical education are never promoted hence they are omitted from the 
promotion regression. 
Figure 8: Layoﬀ and promotion regressions
6C o n c l u s i o n
Firms are known to oﬀer highly complex contracts to their employees. In this paper we study how
incentive are used in practice and provide a theoretical motivation for how the incentive mix observed
in ﬁrms can be seen as an optimal contract.
A basic model with homogenous employees and the four most often used incentive parameters (base
wage, bonuses, ﬁring and promotion) is presented. This model replicates the ﬁndings in MacLeod and
Malcolmson (1998) where the ﬁrm’s use of either performance pay or eﬃciency wages is an optimal
responses to the given market conditions. The basic model is transformed into an integrative model in
the spirit of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and extended to an inﬁnitely repeated game with heteroge-
nous employees. In this context three building blocks: job assignment, learning and human capital,
are sequentially added.
Job assignment provides the critical result: the optimal incentive mix. The reason is that the
heterogeneity of employees provides a dual role for ﬁring. First, it creates incentives for the employees
as in the basic model. Second, it is a sorting device that allows the ﬁrm to adjust the composition of
the workforce to the proﬁt maximizing level. The sorting mechanism introduces non-linearities into
the maximization problem that creates the basis for a incentive mix of performance pay and eﬃciency
wages to be an optimal contract.
The remaining two building blocks creates a closer link between the theoretical model and the
observed data. Learning implies that wages increase in the employees perceived ability. Human capital
link education to the parameters of the model through is close relation to employee ability.
The integrative model provides conjectures with respect to the contract’s four incentive parameters:
base wage, bonus, ﬁring and promotion. The conjectures are tested in the empirical section of the paper
21using four years of monthly personnel records from an international pharmaceutical company.
A ﬁrst result established is that the ﬁrm has positive sorting in tenure and rank that is individuals
with higher ability will in general be more likely to have longer tenure and be assigned to jobs at
a higher rank in the ﬁrm. The positive sorting implies that the likelihood of receiving bonuses is
increasing in tenure conditional on rank and in rank conditional on tenure - a result that is conﬁrmed
by the data.
Secondly, learning is established to be important for wage determination as employees use signals
in the bargaining with ﬁrms to increase the base wage. In particular we ﬁnd that education, tenure,
current rank and past bonus payments have a positive eﬀect on the level of current wages.
Finally, it is established that the probability of promotion is increasing in past bonus payments
whereas bonus payments reduce the risk of being ﬁred.
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Tenure less than 2 years  -  - 















Unskilled -  - 



















    
Demographic variables  YES  YES 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
    
Log likelihood  -1992.38 
# observations  128,233 
Note: Reference category is: “Stay within rank”. Individual observations with tenure less than one year are omitted 
from the regression due to the inclusion of the lagged bonus payment variable. 
Figure 9: Multinomial logit.
237.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma (1). Notice ﬁrst, that the proﬁt is a linear function of the ﬁring probability:
Π(πF)=( θ + δ)C
w
z }| {













− (1 − θ − δ)πFUF − ¯ U











The ﬁrst order derivative is:
2(1 − θ − δ)
UP
H
− UF − (1 − θ − δ)K
Consequently, the maximum is obtained when the ﬁring probability is maximal or minimal such
that the regularity conditions are not violated. The two extremes correspond to the eﬃciency wage
(πF =0 )and the performance pay (πF > 0) solution. For the sake of completeness the two possible
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If the FOC is undetermined, then the ﬁrm chooses the performance pay solution as it involves the
least ﬁring.
Proof of Remark (1). The proof follows directly from the intuition provided after stating the
lemma. Slack is either inconsistent with proﬁt maximizing (for promotion slack) or implies eﬃciency
wage (for bonus slack) or zero wage (for wage slack).
P r o o fo fL e m m a( 2 ) . The lemma is proven by the discussion preceding it. Obtaining the solution
to the stationary contract boils down to sloving the period problem. This is what was done in Lemma
(1).
Proof of Remark (2). The pooling equilibrium arrise if the ﬁrm cannot force the workers to self-
select ex-ante. That is, the bad type will accept the contract even if the ﬁrm sets the parameters of the
contract such that they create the strongest possible incentives. For the suﬃcient condition consider
the following: The strongest incentives trivially includes zero ﬁxed wages and unit ﬁring probability.
Then the promotion probability is determined through the feasibility (F) constraint of problem (??)
24and the bonus payment is determined through the individual rationality constraint of the good type
i nt h es a m ep r o b l e m .T h u s :
π∗
P =
(1 − δ − µH
F θG − (1 − µH
F )θB)πF + g
H(µFθG +( 1− µF)θB + δ)
b∗ =
¯ UG + e +( 1− θG − δ)UF
θG + δ
−
(1 − θG − δ)+g
H(θG + δ)
UP
Consequently, a suﬃcient condition for the pooling equilibrium is as follows:
−e +( θB + δ)[b∗ + π∗
PUP] − (1 − θB − δ)UF = ¯ U∗
B ≥ ¯ UB
Proof of Lemma (3). Given a ﬁxed ﬁring probability, the percentage of good workers employed by
the ﬁrm can be determined. The measure of bad employees ﬁr e di ns t e a d ys t a t ei sg i v e na s :
(1 − µ∗
F)(1 − θB − δ)πF
The measure of good employees ﬁred:
µ∗
F(1 − θG − δ)πF
The steady state condition is that the composition of the workforce does not change any further. This
c a nb ec a p t u r e da st h em e a s u r eo fg o o de m p l o y e e sl e a v i n gt h eﬁrm in any period equals to the measure
of good employees entering the ﬁrm. It is summarized in the following equation:
measure of good type newly hired
z }| {
µ[(1 − µ∗
F)(1 − θB − δ)πF + µ∗
F(1 − θG − δ)πF | {z }
measure of all ﬁred
+ g]=
measure of good type ﬁred
z }| {
µ∗
F(1 − θG − δ)πF + µ∗
Fg
The statement on µ∗
F follows directly from here.
For the higher rank the steady state composition is given by the following logic. In the steady
state only the equilibrium proportion of promoted workers matters. All initial diﬀerences - if any -
are deﬂated to zero by natural turnover g. The volume of good quality workers promoted is given
by µ∗
F(θG + δ)πP and the volume of bad quality workers promoted is (1 − µ∗
F)(θB + δ)πP. Hence the
proprotion is as is given in the lamma.
Proof of Lemma (4). It is straightforward to create an example of an interior solution. Take, for
instance, the parameter choice used for Figure (1). Expressing all the other variables in terms of the
ﬁring decision variable as in the previous subsection yields the proﬁt function as the function of the
25ﬁring parameter (πF).
Π(πF)=
µ(1 − θB − δ)πF(θG + δ)




































[(1 − θG − δ)πF − µ(1 − θG − δ)](θB + δ)






















−(e − (θG + δ)[
e
δ
− πFUF]+( 1− θG − δ)πFUF + ¯ UG)
−
µ(1 − θB − δ)πF
(1 − θG − δ)πF − µ(1 − θG − δ)+µ(1 − θB − δ)πF
(1 − θG − δ)πFK
−
(1 − θG − δ)πF − µ(1 − θG − δ)
(1 − θG − δ)πF − µ(1 − θG − δ)+µ(1 − θB − δ)πF
(1 − θB − δ)πFK
This is shown on Figure (1).
Proof of Lemma (5). Given the separation and promotion probabilities we have
Pr(tenure = j,rank = r|G)
= k(j,r) [(θG + δ)πP]
r [1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF]
j−r




Pr(tenure = j,rank = r|B)
= k(j,r) [(θB + δ)πP]
r [1 − (θB + δ)πP − (1 − θB − δ)πF]
j−r




for j ≥ 0,0 ≤ r ≤ j. Where πS|B and πS|B are the probabilities of leaving a given rank for the good
and bad workers, respectively and k(j,r) are coeﬃcients depending on j and r.
Recalling that the initial proportion of good types hired by the ﬁrm is µ then the probability of
being of a good type conditional on tenure and rank becomes
PG =P r ( G|tenure = j,rank = r)
=




µk(j,r) [(θG + δ)πP]
r £
1 − πS|G




and the probability of being a bad type given tenure and rank is
PB =P r ( B|tenure = t,rank = r)=1− PG
using the fact that good workers are more productive than bad workers i.e. θG = θB +   with  >0
and the notation that π = πP = πF + γ we can calculate the ratio of the proportion of good workers





µk(j,r) [(θG + δ)πP]
r [1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF]
j−r
(1 − µ)k(j,r) [(θB + δ)πP]
r [1 − (θB + δ)πP − (1 − θB − δ)πF]
j−r
=
µ[(θB +   + δ)π]
r [1 − (θB +   + δ)π − (1 − θB −   − δ)(π − γ)]
j−r
(1 − µ)[(θB + δ)π]
r [1 − (θB + δ)π − (1 − θB − δ)(π − γ)]
j−r
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µ[(θB +   + δ)π]
r [(1 − π)+( 1− θB −   − δ)γ]
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(1 − µ)[(θB + δ)π]
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Proof of Lemma (6). Lemma (5) has direct implications for the bonus payments since
Pr(bonus|tenure = j,rank = r)=PG(θG + δ)+PB(θB + δ)
= PG(θG + δ)+( 1− PG)(θB + δ)
= PG(θG + δ)+( 1− PG)(θG −   + δ)






































P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y( 1 ) . Follows directly from Lemma (6).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y( 2 ) . Follows directly from Lemma (6).
Proof of Lemma (7). Note that as bonus, ﬁring and promotion variables are history independent,
the proofs of lemmas (5) and (6) are directly applicable. The proof on wage proﬁle follows trivially
from equations (7) and (8) and observing that a past bonus payment (as opposed to the lack of it),
always increases the probability that the employee is of good type. Of course, the results are valid,
even if the terms in equation (8) are not diﬀerentiable.
Proof of Lemma (8). The ﬁrst statement follows trivially from the education bias. The second
statement follows from understanding that education signals higher ability to all potential employees.
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